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ABSTRACT Agency heads, who have the primary responsibilityfor setting
an agency's policy preferences, have a variety of tools by which they attempt to
minimize the discretion of their staff officials in an effort to ensure agency
policy preferences are consistently applied. One such mechanism is subjecting
agency official's determinationsto higher-level agency review. While scholars
have long surmised thatjudges seek to minimize reversal of their decisions by
a higher-level court, how agency officials' decisions are influenced by higherlevel agency reconsiderationhas mostly eluded analysis.
In this Essay, we begin to fill this gap by examining the extent to which
reversal by the Patent Office's internal adjudicatoryboard, the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board ("PTAB"), affects the behavior of patent examiners.
Utilizinga novel databasecomprisingof over 9, ooo unique patent examiners
and their decisions in over 1-3 million patent applications over a ten-year
period, we examine this question. Given the growing concern in heterogeneity
in patent examiner decision-making, understanding how PTAB reversal
affects examiner behavior is important to ensuring that similar patent
applicationsreceive similar decisions at the Patent Office.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office"
or "Agency") has come under increasing scrutiny over inconsistent
patentability determinations. In fiscal year 2017 alone, more than 8,ooo
patent examiners made more than 6oo,ooo patentability decisions.' There is
mounting empirical evidence that these 8,ooo patent examiners have sharply
divergent grant rates, implicating concerns that the decision to grant a patent
is driven not only by the merits of the invention but also by the examiner to
which the application is randomly assigned.2 The concern regarding interexaminer disparities is so pressing that it led at least one scholar to quip,
"there may be as many patent offices as patent examiners."3
The harms associated with inter-examiner disparities in decision-making
are undeniable. To begin, the fact of wildly divergent grant rates among
examiners is highly suggestive that the Patent Office is regularly getting the
decision to grant or deny a patent wrong. Much is at stake with the application
of legal patentability standards. The patent system encourages valuable
innovations by granting patents on inventions that are novel and that
represent more than a trivial advancement over the current scientific
understanding. However, should patents be issued covering technologies that
fail to meet proper patentability thresholds, there may be an insufficient level
of spurred innovation to justify the key costs of extending patent protection:

1.
1o,

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 17, at
(2017) [hereinafter USPTO PAR 2017], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/

168 tbl.1

.

documents/USPTOFYi 7PAR.pdf.
2.
Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An EmpiricalStudy of Examiner Allowance Rates, STAN.
TECH. L. REV., Oct. 2011, at 1, 6-7; Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Knowledge Spillovers
and Learning in the Workplace: Evidencefrom the U.S. Patent Office 15 fig. 1 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 2018-11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=30 9 902 9
lain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal? The Impact of Characteristicson
3.
Patent Statistics and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 28

(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
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higher prices and restricted access to the patented invention. As a result, if
examiners are allowing invalid patents to issue, these patents may impose the
costs of the patent system on society without producing the commensurate
innovative benefits.4 Alternatively, if patent examiners are routinely denying
patents on valid inventions, then innovation incentives may be dampened. To
the extent that future inventors can observe these erroneous patent denials,
they will discount the value of participating in the patent system to reflect
concerns that they too may have their patent improvidently rejected.5 Beyond
implicating examination quality concerns, inconsistent examiner decisions
also offend theories of administrative justice while also raising questions of
6

equity.

One of the primary mechanisms by which agencies bring uniformity to
low-ranking official's determinations is by subjecting their decisions to higherlevel agency review. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB" or "the
Board"), which sits in panels of three administrative patentjudges, reviews the
determinations of patent examiners and reverses those in which they believe
the examiner has erred. PTAB has been the subject of increasing scholarly
attention and just this past term the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Board.7 However, the impact of PTAB on examiner
decision-making has eluded analysis. While empirical examinations of the
role agency adjudicatory boards play in bringing consistency to agency
determinations has received scant scholarly attention, the few studies to date
focusing on this issue conclude that agency adjudicatory boards largely fail to
perform this consistency-enhancing function.8
The dearth of empirical scholarship addressing these issues stems at least
in part from the difficulty of measuring the behavior of low-level
administrative actors and uniformity in their practices. The Patent Office is
helpful in this regard given the predictability offered by the relatively
homogenous nature of examiners'jobs. In essence, examiners are tasked with
4. The harms associated with invalid patents are substantial. For a summary, see Michael
D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad
Patents?:Evidencefrom a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 618-21 (2015) (summarizing the
harms associated with invalid patents).
5. Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217,
1224-25 (2017).
6. JERRY L. MASHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY

CLAIMS 25-26 (1983); see also Robert A. Kagan, InsideAdministrative Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 816,
820 (1984) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY

DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983)) (detailing how Mashaw's "bureaucratic rationality" is a model of
agency adjudication that facilitates "[g]reater control and consistency" by placing "the overriding
value" on "accurate, efficient and consistent implementation of centrally-formulated policies").
7. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377
-79 (2018).
8. David Hausman, TheFailureoflmmigrationAppeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1196 (2016)
(concluding that the Board of Immigration Appeals is largely ineffective in bringing uniformity
across immigration judges).
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reviewing patent applications and determining whether a patent should be
granted covering the underlying invention, a decision that can readily be
codified and recorded. Moreover, it is exceedingly rare to be able to match
data covering the behaviors of low-level administrative agents with
information regarding administrative board reviews. Fortunately, we were
able to collect data on both the application-level decisions that examiners
make and the adjudicatory decisions of PTAB and to link those data sources
by unique identifier codes assigned to each patent application and issued
patent.
At the core of this empirical exercise is a database covering the behaviors
of over 15,000 patent examiners making over four million patentability
determinations between 2oo

and 2017.9 At some point over their careers,

64% of these examiners experienced a reversal of a rejection that they had
made by PTAB (and its predecessor, the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("BPAI")). Reviews of rejections were possible over our entire
sample period, whereas PTAB only began reviewing patent grant
determinations in late 2012. Out of those examiners actively reviewed in the
latter period, nearly io% of them had experienced a PTAB challenge over
the patentability of a patent that they had decided to grant. This Essay uses
these data to begin to fill the above-noted gap in the literature regarding
administrative boards and consistency in agency determinations by examining
the extent to which PTAB helps to bring greater uniformity to patent
examiners decisions.
Our findings are promising. To begin, we find evidence that applications
reviewed by restrictive examiners-i.e., inherently rejection-prone
examiners-are more likely to ultimately have a rejection that is appealed and
reversed than applications reviewed by non-restrictive/lenient examiners.
This result is encouraging from a uniformity-inducing perspective to the
extent that one would not believe that PTAB's reversal function would lead to
convergence in behavior if, for some reason, the Board were targeting its
rejection-reversal activities on examiners who were already rejecting at very
low rates. Similarly, we find evidence that applications reviewed by lenient
examiners-i.e., inherently grant-prone examiners-are more likely to be
associated with a patent issuance that is the subject of a PTAB challenge than
applications reviewed by more restrictive examiners. To the extent that
PTAB's post-grant challenges are more targeted at applications reviewed by
high-grant-rate examiners, this fact further establishes a foundation by which
PTAB may induce convergence in examiner behavior.
Of course, just knowing that PTAB is targeting its review efforts in this
manner does not tell us that greater uniformity in behavior will ultimately
follow. The second part of our empirical analysis tests, in turn, whether the
targeted examiners' behavior will converge-e.g., whether low-grant-rate
9.

See infra Section IVA for more information about the data this Essay analyzes.

o0 g]
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examiners whose rejections were challenged will increase their grant rates
towards the mean. We indeed find evidence of subsequent convergence in
behavior. For instance, we find that, after being reversed by PTAB for an
erroneous rejection decision, the affected examiner's grant rate increases.o
However, the magnitude of these corrections is notably stronger in the case
of PTAB challenges over rejection decisions than allowance decisions.
Collectively, both of these sets of findings-targeting of PTAB challenges
on the appropriate end of the granting distribution and the subsequent
corrections in examiner practices-suggest that PTAB is playing a notable
role in unifying patent examiner decision-making. However, given the
separation in time and the separation from the examination process itself,
PTAB's post-grant evaluation function is arguably playing a weaker role in this
regard.
Part II proceeds by outlining the harms associated with heterogeneity in
Patent Office outcomes. It then turns to analyzing how PTAB can provide a
consistency-enhancing function to patent examiner patentability decisions.
Part III delineates examiner disparities and introduces the predictions
associated with PTAB's role in enhancing consistency in patent examiner
decisions, which serve as the hypotheses that will guide our empirical analysis.
Part IV describes the data set and methodology utilized. The results of our
empirical analysis are also presented in this Part. Part V begins to explore
implications of our results.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

HARMs ASSOCIATED WITH HETEROGENEITY IN PATENT OFFICE OUTCOMES

In the past 20 years, the Patent Office has tripled the number of patent
applications it processes annually." As the number of patentability
determinations the Agency makes in a given year grows, so too have concerns
over uniformity in Patent Office outcomes. There is mounting empirical
evidence that patent examiner grant rates wildly diverge.12 The Agency has
come under increasing criticism that the decision to grant a patent
application is driven not only by the merits of the invention, but also by
happenstance as to which examiner the application is randomly assigned.'s

1o.

See infra Section IV.C.

11.
Compare USPTO PAR 2017, supra note 1, at io, 168, with U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 13 (1998), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/performance-

and-planning/annual-reports/annual-report-998-o.
12.
Tu, supranote 2, at lo-11; see also Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 2, at 15 fig..
13.
See Cockburn et al., supranote 3, at 24-25 (finding that differences in examiners explain
a significant percentage of the variation in the characteristics of issued patents, and that some
examiners are more likely than others to have their patents upheld in court); see also Douglas
Lichtman, Rethinking ProsecutionHistoryEstoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 154-55 (2004) (finding
that certain examiners more systematically required applicants to narrow the scope of their patents).
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Commentators have only recently begun to identify the drivers of
heterogeneity in patent examiner decision-making. For instance, we now
know that examiner grant rates tend to rise over the course of examiners'
careers.'4 More specifically, grant rates sharply increase when patent
examiners get promotions associated with less time to review applications.5 A
separate study has demonstrated that the year an examiner was hired had a
6
lasting impact on his or her granting proclivities.' Examiners who started
working when the Patent Office had a more permissive granting culture have
higher grant rates throughout their careers than those who started working
when the Agency's granting culture was more restrictive.'7 The training that
newly hired patent examiners receive also plays a strong role in shaping their
granting tendencies.' 8
Although commentators are still seeking to understand the drivers of
examiner heterogeneity, the harms associated with inconsistent patent
determinations are well understood. Disparities in examiner decision making
suggest that at least some patent examiners are "missing the mark."
Patentability standards are designed to generally parallel the economic
justifications for patents-that is, a patent should not be granted to an
invention that is not novel because such non-novel patents have the potential
to impose the costs of the patent system on society without producing the
commensurate innovative benefits.'9 As a result, the consequences of
examiners routinely erring in reaching patentability determinations can be
substantial.2o

Aside from the concerns that inconsistent examinations invoke regarding
the quality of the review process itself, inter-examiner disparity may also erode
confidence in the Patent Office by creating the appearance of unfairness and
arbitrariness. 21 The dominant theories of administrative justice, such as Jerry
Mashaw's theory of "bureaucratic rationality," hold that uniformity in agency

14.

Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristicsand Patent Office Outcomes, 94

REv. ECON. & STAT. 817, 817 (2012); see also Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the

Time Allocated to Review PatentApplications InducingExaminers to GrantInvalid Patents?Evidencefrom

MicrolevelApplicationData, 99 REv. ECON. & STAT. 550, 550-51 (2017).

See mley & Sampat, supranote 14, at 81 7; see alsoFrakes & Wasserman, supra note 14, at 550.
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, PatentOffice Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. i6o, 1639 (2o16).
17. Id.
18. Id.
See, e.g., Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 4, at 618-21 (summarizing the harms
ig.
associated with invalid patents).
The harms associated with invalid patents are substantial. See id. at 618-21. The harms
20.
associated with the denial of valid patents are also substantial. For a summary, see Yelderman,
supra note 5, at 1224-25.
Michael Abramowicz &John F. Duffy, Ending the PatentingMonopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
21.
1541, 1558 (2009) (noting that the Patent Office's "challenge is to ensure that thejudgments of
[its patent examiners] are of relatively high quality and highly consistent"); see MASHAW, supra
note 6, at 73.
15.

16.
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outcomes is an important goal.22 The appearance of arbitrary decisionmaking could diminish the incentives for innovation, as would-be applicants
might decide to pursue other endeavors. Inconsistent patentability decisions
are also worrisome solely from an equity standpoint.
B.

PATENT TiAL AND APPEAL BOARD'S CONSISTENCY-ENHANCING FUNCTIoN

Given this swath of harms associated with heterogeneity in agency
outcomes, it is unsurprising that agency heads often try to cabin the discretion
of agency officials in an attempt to harmonize outcomes.2 3 The Director of
the Patent Office has several mechanisms to limit examiner discretion,
including subjecting examiner decisions to higher-level agency review.24 This
Section explores how the Patent Office's adjudicatory tribunal, PTAB,
functions to bring uniformity to patentability determinations.5
PTAB reviews examiner decisions, overturning those in which it believes
the examiner has erred. 6 PTAB is comprised of statutory members and over
300 administrative patent judges ("APJs"), who sit in panels that consist of at
least three members.27 PTAB has the potential to bring uniformity to
examiner decisions through two primary capacities: lawmaking and error
correction. The Board acts in a lawmaking function when it provides clarity
to indeterminate areas of the law by reviewing an examiner's patentability
decisions. Existing legal doctrines do not always adapt to emerging fields of
science. When inventors begin to file applications on these new technologies,
the Board may fill this legal void. The Board's decision as to when genes and
gene fragments meet the utility standard is one such example. 8 Similarly, the
PTAB can help to fill gaps in the law that exist after the federal courts
announce new precedent. However cognizant courts are of the need to issue
opinions that clarify the law's demands for similarly situated parties, courts
rarely eliminate the discretion of other decision-makers in applying those
opinions. Ex parteMewherter, in which the PTAB considered whether machinereadable storage mediums constituted patentable subject matter, illustrates

this gap-filling role of the Board.29 The publishing of PTAB opinions, as well
as the designation of select opinions as precedential, enhances the ability of

22.

MASHAw, supra note 6, at 25-26; Kagan, supranote 6, at 820.

ChristopherJ. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World ofAgency Adjudication, 107
141, 176-77 (2019).
Id.
24.
35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
25.
26. Id. § 6(b). Administrative patentjudges are "persons of competent legal knowledge and
scientific ability who are appointed by the Secretary [of Commerce], in consultation with the
[Patefit Office] Director." Id. § 6(a).
27.
Id.
28. ExparteFisher, No. 2002-2046, 2004 WL 2185929, at *3-14 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 1, 2004).
29.
ExparteMewherter, No. 2012-007692, at 4-7 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2013).
23.

CALIF. L. REV.

2424
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the Board to fill this lawmaking role.so Overall, by eliminating indeterminacy

in the law and reducing the discretion of examiners, the PTAB's lawmaking
function helps to increase uniformity in Patent Office outcomes.
PTAB can also increase uniformity in examiner decision-making by
reversing examiners who erroneously applied existing legal doctrine. In this
error-correction role, the Board is not necessarily fulfilling a lawmaking
function but instead correcting the decisional process of an examiner who
inaccurately applied existing law. The internal appeal process may improve
error detection by relying upon interested parties to identify when the lower
ranking decisions are wrong and hence appeal them for higher-level
reconsideration.31 This decision-reversal role is the mechanism of primary
interest in this Essay. Not only might this decision-reversal role create more
uniformity by detecting errant decisions as they occur, but it may also shape
behaviors in a more prospective sense. That is, the possibility of reversal by
PTAB may encourage examiners to comply with more prevailing norms to the
extent that examiners place disutility on such reversals. The power of this
mechanism-which one might think of as a "deterrence" channel-may be
especially strong in the case of those examiners who have already experienced
a reversal event.
As one of us has previously explored, PTAB's ability to bring
homogeneity to examiner decisions was historically highly skewed.32 Many
agency officials' decisions can be appealed within the agency by two sets of
constituents, enabling the agency's adjudicatory board to correct the full
spectrum of agency error. Take, for example, permit decisions initially made
by one of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Office of the
Regional Administrators.3 If the EPA Regional Administrator decides to
reject a permit to discharge pollutants, the aggrieved applicant can appeal the
decision to the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB") and argue that the
agency's permit requirements are too restrictive or that the EPA Regional
Administrator misapplied the existing requirements to the detriment of the

&

For a summary of how PTAB designated opinions as precedential, see Walker
30.
Wasserman, supra note 23, at 191-9-6.

31.
See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means ofError Correction, 2 4J. LEGAL STUD. 3 79,
381 (1995)32. Technically, the previous work explored the federal courts review of the Board's
decision, but the same principle is at work in high lever agency review of agency official's
decisions. See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive PatentLaw, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 401-07 (20 1) [hereinafter Wasserman, The PTO's
Asymmetric Incentives] (examining how the asymmetric review of the Patent Office's prior
adjudicatory board, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, created an incentive for the
agency to adopt pro-patent interpretations of the Patent Act); see also Melissa F. Wasserman,
Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEx. L. REv. 625, 655-58
(2015) (discussing how asymmetric review of agency decisions by federal courts can create a proregulatory constituency bias in the development of substantive law).
40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a) (2018).
33.

2019]
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applicant34 On the other hand, if the EPA decides to grant the permits to
discharge pollutants, then interested parties, such as environmental groups,
can appeal the decision to the EAB and argue that the agency permitting
criteria are too permissive or that the EPA Regional Administrator misapplied
the existing requirement to the detriment of the interested party.35 In such a
case, the possibility of symmetrical review gives the agency's adjudicatory
board the opportunity to correct the full spectrum of error.
In contrast, because the Patent Office's adjudicatory board historically
only had statutory authority to review examiner decisions to deny patents, its
ability to bring uniformity to examiner decision-making has mostly been onesided over time.s 6 If a patent examiner denies an application, disgruntled
applicants can appeal the decision to the Board.37 In contrast, if the patent
examiner granted the patent, there had historically been no robust
mechanism before the Agency to challenge the grant of a patent38 As a result,
the Board could help harmonize examiner decision-making, but this function
was limited to correcting those examiners that were overly restrictive-i.e.,
examiners rejecting too many valid patents. Because the Board did not have
the authority to review patent grants, it could do little in the past (including
the recent past) to correct overly permissive examiners-i.e., examiners
granting too many bad patents.
That changed in 201 1 (effective late 2012) when Congress created three
new adjudicatory proceedings that provide third parties with a procedurally
robust, streamlined way to contest the validity of a patent grant at PTAB.39
These new proceedings-known as Post-Grant Review, Inter Partes Review
("IPR"), and the transitional program for Covered Business Method Review

34. See id. § 124.19(a)-(b) (describing the process, including what parties, can file an
appeal of a petition determination); see also FrequentlyAsked Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
ENvrL. APPEALS BD., https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EABWebDocket-nsf/General+Information/
Frequently+Asked+Questions?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
35. 40 C.F.R. 124.19(a).
36. Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives, supra note 32, at 401-06.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2012) (outlining when a party may seek a Board appeal); see also
Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives, supra note 32, at 404-05 (discussing how the Patent
Office's adjudicatory board historically had the authority to review only patent denials).
38.

Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives, supra note 32, at 404.

39.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see id.

§6

(codified at 35 U.S.C. §H 311-319, 321-329 (2012)) (describing "inter partes review" and other
"post-grant review proceedings"); id. § 18 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321) (describing the
"transitional program for covered business-method patents"); see also KENT BARNETT ET AL.,
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS,
SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 15, 18 (Draft Report 2018), https://www.acus.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/Non-ALJ%2oDraft%2oReport.2.pdf (reporting there were 275
administrative patent judges as of 2017); Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader Swears in New
Administrative Patent judges, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
(noting there were
2012/01/2 5 /chief-judge-rader-swears-in-new-administrative-patent-judges
approximately soo APJs in 2oi ).
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-have been immensely popular, requiring the Patent Office to triple the
number of administrative patentjudges to handle the influx of petitions.40 As
a result, both sides of patent examiners' decisions-whether to grant or deny
a patent-are now subject to higher-level agency review. In theory, this change
should allow PTAB to rein in not only overly restrictive but also overly
permissive examiners, giving the Board the ability to correct agency error
across the full spectrum of decision-making.
While the Patent Office's adjudicatory board has been the subject of
increasing scholarly attention, little is known as to how well PTAB harmonizes
patent examiner decision-making.41 Empirical investigations of PTAB to date
have largely focused on the outcomes of the adjudicatory board and the
Board's interaction with federal court litigation-not the effect of the Board
on examiner decision-making. For instance, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti Rai,
and Jay Kesan examined the extent to which these new proceedings provide
a substitute for Article III patent validity litigation.42 Brian Love and Shawn
Ambwani reported outcomes of IPRs and their "impact on co-pending patent
litigation."43 This empirical shortcoming is not unique to the patent literature.
In fact, the extent to which higher-level agency review helps to unify agency
outcomes has eluded analysis in the broader administrative law literature as
well.44 Similar to the empirical investigations of PTAB, empirical studies of
agency adjudicatory boards have tended to focus on the Board's outcomes
rather than its role in aligning low-ranking official determinations with agency
policy.45

40.

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & AccOuNTABILnTY REPORT: FISCAL

-

YEAR 2013, at 23 (2013) [hereinafter USPTO PAR 2013] (noting that the "tremendous inflow of
new proceedings is higher than initially estimated"); see also BARNETT ET AL., supra note 39, at 18,
22; Quinn, supra note 39.
41. See generaUy, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:
ChallengingPatents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2015) (reviewing statistics and final
decisions of the PTO); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board'sEvolving
Impact on Claim Construction, 24 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J- 301, 320-23 (2016) (evaluating potential
impacts of PTAB on claim construction doctrine); Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of
Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 377, 377 (2017) (assessing "claims
that adjudication of the validity of issued patents in the [USPTO] is unconstitutional"); Walker
& Wasserman, supra note 23, at 162-74 (situating PTAB adjudication in the modern landscape
of agency adjudication).
See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and
42.
District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2016) (examining, among other things, the
extent to which these new proceedings are being utilized as a substitute for Article III patent
validity litigation).
43. Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 8 i U.
CHI. L. REv. DIALOGUE 93, 95 (2014).
44. One notable exception is Hausman, supra note 8, at 1181-86.
45. See Gerald K Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis by
the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Pushfrom the Administrative Conference of the United States) is
TransformingSocial Security DisabilityAdjudication, 83 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1575, 1604-07 (2015)
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THEORY

PATENT EXAMINER HETEROGENEITY.: Do PTAB APPEALS Focus ON OUTLERS?

The average grant rate of a patent examiner is roughly 67% over our full
sample period. The granting tendencies of patent examiners-the rates at
which they allow applications-vary dramatically around this mean. The
standard deviation of examiner-specific grant rates across examiners is
roughly 20%. Normalizing this variation by its mean level, this implies a
coefficient of variation in examiner grant rates of roughly 0.30. Overall, this
suggests a magnitude of examiner heterogeneity and allows us to easily reject
the hypothesis that the degree of variation in grant rates we observe across
examiners arises from chance alone. When focusing on the full sample of
individual patent applications and regressing the incidence of the application
being granted on a set of fixed effects for the various examiners, we estimate
an F-statistic of 55 for the joint significance of the fixed effects. With this
statistic, we can reject, with a greater than 99% level of confidence, the
hypothesis that there are no differences in granting practices across
examiners.
In Figure i, we attempt to show the findings above graphically. We start
in Figure mA by setting forth a kernel density plot depicting the probability
distribution of examiner grant rates across the full extent of the examiners
included in our sample. As can be seen from Figure iA alone, examiner grant
rates vary widely across nearly the full spectrum of possible rates. In Figure
iB, we show what this distribution might look like by chance. For these
purposes, we take each individual application across our sample and assign it
a random number between o and 1. Based on this number, we derive a
placebo indicator for whether or not the given application is granted-i.e., by
setting the placebo indicator equal to "1" for values of the randomly assigned
number that fall below the true mean grant rate across the sample (0.67). For
each examiner, we then derive a mean rate of these placebo grants and
thereafter set forth in Figure IB a kernel density plot depicting the
distribution of examiner placebo grant rates. By comparing these
distributions, it is evident that the true rate of variation in grant rates across
examiners varies considerably more than the variation than we might predict
to occur if granting outcomes were randomly and independently determined
across each individual application.
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iA. Distribution of Examiner Grant Rates
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Note: This figure presents a kernel density plot (Epanechnikov kernel with "optional"
bandwidth) of examiner grant rates across all examiners in the sample.

Figure IB. Distribution of Placebo Grant Rates across Examiners
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Note: This figure presents a kernel density plot (Epanechnikov kernel with "optional"
bandwidth) of placebo grant rates across all examiners in the sample.

It is important to note that patent applications are randomly assigned to
examiners within an Art Unit-a group of 15 to 20 patent examiners who
review applications in the same area of technology. As a result, Figure iA's
variation is not merely a result of differences in the patent worthiness of
applications being assigned to patent examiners.4 6 One may nonetheless be

46.
A recent paper, however, by Cesare Righi and Timothy Simcoe documents evidence of
within-technology-group assignments based on sub-technology specializations. See generallyCesare

Righi & Timothy Simcoe, PatentExaminer Specialization(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 23913, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w2391 3 (documenting the evidence of
sub-technology specialization assignments). However, Righi and Simcoe's analysis finds no
evidence to suggest that applications are sorted across examiners based on the importance or
claim breadth of the applications or on their patent worthiness. Id.
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concerned that Figure iA merely reflects differences in underlying grant rates
across technology groups, as opposed to differences across individual
examiners. Accordingly, in Figure 2, we show the degree of variation in grant
rates across examiners, but we instead capture the inherent, fundamental
granting proclivity of examiners. For these purposes, we assign a grant rate to
each examiner that effectively partials out the influence of other factors that
are likely (or known) to affect examiner grant rates and that are themselves
likely to vary across examiners. Such factors include the technology groups to
which the examiners are assigned, the year in which the examiner disposes of
the underlying application, the entity size of the applicant (e.g., an indicator
for a large-entity applicant), the experience level of the examiner, and the pay
grade of the examiner on the General Schedule ("GS") pay scale (which
affects the amount of time examiners have to review applications). To achieve
this effect, we use the sample of individual applications and regress the
incidence of the application being granted on a set of dichotomous variables
reflecting each of these factors along with a set of examiner fixed effects. In
Figure 2, we then depict a kernel plot of the distribution of estimated
examiner fixed effects across the various examiners in our sample. As
demonstrated, while this somewhat dampens the degree of spread in grant
rates across examiners relative to Figure iA, it continues to reflect a far greater
degree of variation than one would predict by chance alone.
Figure

-1

2.

Distribution of Estimated Examiner Fixed Effects

-.5
Estimated Examiner Fixed Effects

0

.5

Note: This figure presents a kernel density plot (Epanechnikov kernel with "optional" bandwidth)
of estimated examiner fixed effects across all examiners in the sample. Examiner fixed effects are
derived from the predicted values from a regression of the incidence of the application being
granted on a series of an examiner fixed effects, along with year effects, examiner GS levels,
examiner experience levels and various application-level characteristics (large entity status of
applicant, foreign priority status of applicant, and duration of examination and its square).
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If PTAB were to be applied in a way that would counteract this crossexaminer heterogeneity and promote the uniform application of patent law,
one would first expect that PTAB would target its evaluative activity on those
examiners in greatest deviation from the norm. In other words, if PTAB
hoped to facilitate convergence in examiner behavior, we would expect that
its rejection-reversal efforts be focused on low-grant-rate / high-rejection-rate
examiners and its grant-reversal efforts be focused on high-grant-rate
examiners.
Hypothesis i (A): The likelihood that an examiner ever experiences a PTAB
(orBPAI) reversal of an applicationrejection will be higherfor examiners at
the lower ends of the examiner-grant rate distribution.
Hypothesis i (B): The likelihood that an examiner ever experiences a
validity challenge to PTAB of a patent that he or she had previously allowed
will be higher for examiners at the upper ends of the examiner-grant rate
distribution.
We should note that Hypotheses i (A) and (B) are driven, in part, by a
mechanical relationship. Restrictive examiners are more likely to reject
patents than the average examiner, which will lead to a greater probability of
a rejection appeal even if PTAB were to randomly review all rejections at the
same likelihood. Similarly, lenient examiners are more likely to allow patents,
which will lead to a greater probability of a post-grant opposition even if PTAB
were to randomly review all issued patents with the same likelihood. In any
event, the mechanical aspect to this targeting likelihood is irrelevant to the
animating question of this Essay-does PTAB bring homogeneity to examiner
decision-making? As long as PTAB is focusing relatively more of its rejectionreversal efforts on low grant-rate examiners (and vice-versa), it holds the
potential to converge practices. It is nonetheless important to test Hypotheses
1 (A) and (B) given the possibility, for instance, that PTAB's rejection-reversal
efforts disproportionately target examiners already exhibiting grant rates at
the upper end of the scale, a state of the world in which PTAB would not be
expected to produce convergent pressures.
Moreover, we note that PTAB's uniformity-inducing powers may go
beyond this mechanical function. Perhaps PTAB focuses its rejection-reversal
efforts on rejections completed by those examiners with low allowance rates.
To explore this possibility of an even stronger targeting role of PTAB, we also
test the following subsidiary hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (C): The likelihood that an individual application rejection
will become the targetof a PTAB (or, previously, a BPAI) appealwill be higher
for examiners at the lower ends of the examiner-grantrate distribution.
Hypothesis 1 (D): The likelihood that an issuedpatent will become the target
of a PTAB validity challenge will be higherfor examiners at the upper ends
of the examiner-grantrate distribution.
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By limiting its focus only to the set of applications receiving at least one
final rejection, Hypothesis i (C) rules out the mechanical effect discussed
above. That is, if PTAB were to review all rejections with an equal probability,
then, by assumption, one would not predict any difference in PTAB activity
rates across this sub-sample of applications. However, if PTAB were to go a
step beyond and affirmatively target its reversal efforts on those examiners
with especially low grant rates, then one would indeed predict to find the
relationship hypothesized in i(C).
B.

DOES PTAB REVERSAL HAVE A LONG-TERM EFFECTON PATENT EXAMINER
DECISION-MAKTNG?

If PTAB brings more homogeneity to patent examiner decision-making,
it may do so not only by correcting specific errant decisions of individual
examiners but also by altering patent examiner behavior in the long term.
One might predict that all examiners-whether or not they have experienced
a PTAB evaluation-would alter their behavior in the direction of PTAB's
expectations given the possibility of a PTAB reversal should they deviate from
those expectations. Such an effect is analogous to what legal scholars refer to
as "general deterrence" in the criminal or tort law context.
One might predict that this effect is even stronger for those examiners
who have specifically had their decisions reversed or challenged by the
adjudicatory board in the past, perhaps due to the visceral nature of this
personal experience. Under this latter channel-which is analogous to what
criminal or tort law scholars would term "specific deterrence"-the affected
examiners would be expected to respond to previous board reversal decisions
(or even mere challenges) by prospectively changing their future behavior in
the manner expected by the Board. For instance, a restrictive patent examiner
who has had a patent rejection reversed by the Board may alter her examining
behavior to become more permissive moving forward. She may respond as
such because she fears PTAB reversal in the future-under the assumption
that she places some amount of disutility on such an outcome-and because
by granting at higher rates she lowers the probability of being subject to that
scrutiny again.47
To summarize, should examiners desire to avoid Board reversals, one
might expect to observe the following pattern of behavior: (1) upon the
Board's reversal of an examiner's rejection decision (or upon a mere appeal

47.

Of course, the validity of a granted patent may also be reviewed by a federal court during

a patent infringement or declaratory judgement action. However, there are several reasons why
a reversal by PTAB is likely more salient to a patent examiner than a reversal by a federal court.
Perhaps most importantly, the average time delay between the issuance of a patent and the final
validity decision, which is 8.6 years, is greater than the tenure of a notable portion of patent

.

examiners. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the Validity ofLitigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. x85, 236 tbl.12 (1998). The time delay between the denial ofa patent and a final
validity decision by PTAB is far shorter. Id. at 236 tbl. 3
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of a rejection decision to the Board), the affected examiner's grant rate
should increase thereafter and (2) upon the Board's invalidation of a patent
issued by an examiner (or upon the filing of a challenge to the Board over
the validity of a patent issued by an examiner), the affected examiner's grant
rate should decrease thereafter. Collectively, these predictions motivate our
second testable hypothesis. If the targeting of the Board's activities predicted
in Hypothesis i above were to hold true and if responses predicted in
Hypothesis 2 (see below) were to likewise hold true, then the net result would
be one in which PTAB operates to induce convergence in examiner behavior.
For instance, if PTAB were to focus its rejection-reversal activity on low grantrate examiners and if rejection-reversal events cause examiners to increase
their grant rates, then we might expect that the below-average grant-rate
examiners will tend to look more like the average examiner over time.
Hypothesis 2 (A): Following PTAB's reversal of an examiner's rejection
decision (or, alternatively, following the filing of an appeal of a rejection
decision to PTAB), the affected examiner'sgrant rate will increasethereafter.
Hypothesis 2 (B): FollowingPTAB's invalidation of a patent previously
issued by an examiner (or, alternatively, following the filing of a challenge
with PTAB over the validity of a patentpreviously issued by an examiner),
the affected examiner's grantrate will decrease thereafter.
IV.

RESULTS

A.

DATA

To explore the role of PTAB in inducing greater uniformity in examiner
behavior, we draw on two key sources of data. First and foremost, we collect
data on individual patent applications from the Patent Office's Patent
Application Information Retrieval ("PAIR") database, covering over 3.9
million utility patent applications that were filed on or after March 2001 and
that reached a final disposition by May 2017. Importantly, for each
application in the PAIR database, we have information on the name of the
examiner primarily charged with reviewing the application, along with
information about the outcome of the application and the various
proceedings that occurred throughout the examination process. For instance,
for each application, we can determine whether or not the applicant appealed
a rejection decision to the BPAI (pre-2012) or to PTAB (post-2012), in
addition to the outcome of that appeal. In each case, we know the precise
dates of these various events---e.g., the date in which a notice of appeal was
recorded for the application.
To complete these data, we merge information on the future PTAB
outcomes of those applications that culminate in a patent issuance
(information that is not otherwise included in the PAIR database). Data on
PTAB filings-specifically IPR filings-were graciously provided to us by Arti
Rai andJacob Sherkow. At the outset, we emphasize several caveats with these
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PTAB data. First, while we collect data on applications that are disposed of by
the Patent Office through May 2017, we only have information on PTAB
challenges that were filed up to March 2016. Second, we only have consistent
data on the date on which PTAB challenge was filed, not the date on which
the Board decided to formally institute (or not institute) the challenge and
not the date on which the Board decided to invalidate the patent in question
(should PTAB have ruled in that manner). Moreover, we also do not have
data on whether the post-grant challenge was ultimately successful. As such,
overall, we have a more limited set of information bearing on PTAB's activities
in the post-grant context relative to PTAB's role in reviewing rejections by
examiners.
Finally, through a series of Freedom of Information Act requests, we have
also collected a range of additional information about the examiner working
at the Patent Office. This includes information regarding the GS pay level of
the associated examiner at the time of application disposition and the year in
which the examinerjoined the Patent Office.
B.

PTAB TARGETING ANALYSIS

With these data in place, we now turn to testing Hypothesis i. To recap,
with our first hypothesis, we are effectively exploring whether PTAB is
8
targeting its evaluative efforts on the appropriate outlying examiners.4 At the
outset, we note that this targeting function involves more than just PTAB. In
the case of evaluations of examiner rejections, the appeals process is of course
initiated by the aggrieved applicants. In the case of evaluations of examiner
allowances, PTAB post-grant evaluations are of course initiated by third party
petitioners. Nonetheless, for the purposes of brevity below, we may simply
collapse this inquiry into one in which we refer to PTAB's role in targeting its
evaluation efforts on certain types of examiners.
We start by exploring whether we see relatively stronger rejection-reversal
activity by PTAB on examiners with stronger tendencies to reject applications
in the first place. As stated above, one can think of this as a pre-condition for
PTAB to act as a device to induce greater uniformity in behavior. The
empirical exercise is rather straightforward. First, for each examiner, we
create a dichotomous variable that equals "1" if an examiner has ever had a
rejection reversed by PTAB (or BPAI) and "o" otherwise. Next, we group
examiners into quartiles based on their overall career grant rates-the
number of applications that they have allowed divided by the number of
applications that they have disposed of. However, instead of using the simple
mean grant rate for each examiner, we assign each examiner a measure
indicative of their inherent granting proclivity by risk-adjusting those grant
rates by other factors that may differ across examiners but that are arguably
orthogonal to this targeting exercise-e.g., the technology group to which the

48.

See supraSection III.A.
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examiner is assigned. In this light, we ensure that we are not simply comparing
the likelihood of experiencing a PTAB reversal across examiners in different
technology groups with fundamentally different grant rates.49
Now, to explore where PTAB is targeting its rejection-reversal activities,
we regress the indicator variable for whether or not an examiner has ever
been reversed on a series of indicator variables capturing the inherent grantrate quartile in which the relevant examiner falls. We omit the indicator
variable for the first quartile from the regression to serve as the reference
group. Put simply, this regression allows us to explore the association between
the likelihood that an examiner experiences a reversal of a rejection that he
or she had issued and where that examiner falls in the distribution of granting
tendencies across examiners. If PTAB were to hold the potential to create
uniformity in examiner behavior, one would hope, as a first step, that its
rejection reversal efforts be focused on those examiners who are more
rejection prone.
We present the results of this exercise in Column i of Table 1. The
reported coefficients suggest that the likelihood an examiner is reversed at
some point over his or her career declines as we move up the various examiner
grant-rate quartiles. For instance, the -0.29 coefficient estimated for the
fourth quartile indicator suggests that the likelihood an examiner in the
bottom grant-rate quartile has a rejection reversed at some point over her
career is roughly 29 percentage points-or roughly 41% relative to the
mean-higher than the likelihood that an examiner in the top grant rate
quartile has a rejection reversed over her career. Similarly, the lowest-grant
rate examiners are roughly 9.4 percentage points and 1.5 percentage-points
more likely to have a rejection reversed at some point relative to examiners in
the third and second quartiles, respectively. All told, these results are
consistent with a story in which PTAB focuses its rejection-reversal efforts on
applications reviewed by examiners who issue the most rejections.

49. More specifically, to form the necessary risk adjustments, we start by taking the
individual sample of applications and regressing the incidence of the application being granted
on a set of examiner fixed effects, along with a series of other variables: technology-group fixed
effects, GS pay-scale fixed effects, experience group (in year) fixed effects, applicationdisposition-year fixed effects, and an indicator variable representing whether or not the relevant
applicant has "small entity" status. We then take the predicted values of the examiner fixed effects
and use these values to indicate the examiner's risk-adjusted career granting tendencies.
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Table 1. PTAB Targeting Analysis Relationship Between Likelihood of
PTAB Rejection-Reversal Activity and Examiner-Grant-Rate Quartiles
(i0

(2)

Dependent Variable = Indicator for
Whether Examiner Associated with
Application Experienced a
Rejection Reversal Over Her Career,
among Sample of all Individual
Applications

Dependent Variable = Indicator
for Whether Relevant Application
was Associated with a Rejection
Reversal, among Sample of
Individual Applications that
Experienced a Final Rejection

Omitted (First
Quartile of Adjusted
Examiner Grant
Rate)

Second Quartile of
Adjusted Examiner
Grant Rate
Third Quartile of
Adjusted Examiner
Grant Rate

-o.0147
(0.097)
-o.o938**
(0029)

00004)

(.0004

Fourth Quartile of

-. 2874***

Adjusted Examiner

-0-oo77***

(o.o163)

(00004)

Grant Rate
N

3,546,290

Variable

1,667,904
127

Mean of Dependent0p7063ar.0
7o63________
0______

0.0127____________

Notes: * significant at io%; * significant at 5%; ~significant at s%. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners
over tine.

As discussed above, an outcome of this nature may arise even if,
hypothetically, PTAB were to issue reversals at an equal rate across all
applications receiving a final rejection. Nonetheless, one may wonder
whether PTAB's role in targeting low-grant rate examiners for rejection
reversals goes beyond this hypothesized neutral stance and whether PTAB
places a greater emphasis on low-grant rate examiners in its rejection-reversal
decisions. To explore this, we simply look at the sub-sample of applications
that received a final rejection and regress an indicator variable for whether
the final rejection was reversed by PTAB on the series of indicator variables
capturing the examiner-grant-rate quartiles, again leaving out the firstquartile variable to serve as the frame of reference. In the neutral-PTAB
hypothesis, one would not predict that the likelihood that this final rejection
would be reversed would differ depending on the granting proclivity of the
assigned examiner. However, as presented in Column 2 of Table i, we find
that this likelihood falls as we move from the bottom to the top of the grantrate distribution. Accordingly, our evidence suggests that the lowest-grant-rate
examiners indeed attract greater PTAB rejection-based scrutiny, even above
and beyond the fact that they are creating more opportunities for this scrutiny
in the first place through their higher rejection rates.
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In Table 2, we extend this analysis, but now look at matters from the
opposite side. Do high grant-rate examiners attract post-grant challenges by
PTAB at a higher rate relative to low-grant-rate examiners? The structure of
this table and methodology underlying it largely parallels that of Table 1. One
exception is that instead of recording whether examiners have experienced
any reversals of their grant decisions over the course of their careers, we
record whether examiners have experienced any PTAB challenges of patents
they have issued. Overall, these PTAB post-grant challenge findings are
consistent with PTAB rejection-reversal findings. If PTAB were to induce
uniformity in examiner behavior, then one would predict that its post-grant
challenge activities-i.e., challenges that would possibly lead to invalidating
previously issued patents-would be focused on examiners at the upper end
of the grant-rate distribution. We find that this precondition is indeed met. In
particular, examiners in the fourth quartile of the inherent grant-rate
distribution are roughly ig percentage points more likely to have issued a
patent that is the subject of a post-grant challenge at some point over their
career relative to examiners in the first quartile.
As above, this relationship may in part be a mechanical by-product of the
fact that the higher grant-rate examiners create more possibilities for postgrant challenges in the first place. To further test whether PTAB's post-grantchallenges target high-grant-rate examiners, we estimate a specification
analogous to that estimated in Column 2 of Table i. In this alternative
approach, we look for evidence of targeting of high-grant rate examiners
while equalizing the opportunity for challenges. To do so, we focus on a
sample of issued patents and regress an indicator variable for whether the
relevant issued patent is ultimately the subject of a PTAB post-grant challenge
on the various quartiles of the examiner grant-rate distribution. We continue
to estimate an increase in the rate of the likelihood of a PTAB challenge as
we move from the bottom to the top of the examiner grant-rate distribution,
suggesting that PTAB is affirmatively focusing its post-grant challenge activity
on the highest grant-rate examiners.
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Table 2. PTAB Targeting Analysis Relationship Between Likelihood of
PTAB Post-Grant Evaluation Activity and Examiner-Grant-Rate Quartiles
Dependent Variable = Indicator
for Whether Examiner Associated

Dependent Variable = Indicator
Variable for Whether Relevant

with Application Issued a Patent
Over her Career that was Subject

Issued Patent was Associated with
PTAB Challenge, among Sample

to PTAB Challenge, among

of Issued Patents

Sample of all Individual
Applications

Omitted (First
Quartile of
Adjusted Examiner

Grant Rate)
Second Quartile of
Adjusted Examiner
Grant Rate
Third Quartile of
Adjusted Examiner
Grant Rate
Fourth Quartile of
Adjusted Examiner
Grant Rate

0.0496***
(.0o253)

-0.
2
(0.00004)

o1ggg***
(0.149)

o.0ooo8*
(0.oooo5

889***
(o.0169)

0.00009*
(0.oooo5)

0.1

N

3,546,290

Mean of
Dependent
Variable

2,370,165

0.2o60

Notes: * significant at io%; ** significant at 5%; **

0.00035
significant at 1%. Standard errors are

reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners
over time.

C.

EXAMINER-RESPONSE ANALYSIS

Above, we found that low grant-rate examiners are more likely to
experience reversals of their rejections. If those low-grant examiners were, in
turn, to increase their grant rates after these reversals, then PTAB may indeed
serve as a device that will lead to greater standardization of examiner practices
over time. Similarly, we had found that high grant-rate examiners are more
likely to experience post-grant challenges. If those high-grant rate examiners
subsequently were to decrease their granting tendencies, then PTAB may also
help to induce convergence from above. In this Section, we attempt to round
out this empirical exercise by exploring how examiners respond prospectively
to experiencing PTAB evaluations of their rejection and allowance
decisions-e.g., do grant rates go up following an experience with a PTAB
rejection-reversal process?
We approach this exercise by employing an event-study methodology
whereby we track the grant rates of examiners over time, where time is
measured with reference to the period leading up to an examiner
experiencing a PTAB rejection reversal (or post-grant challenge) and the
period of time subsequent to such an event. In particular, we show these event-
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time trends graphically where the time relative to the event-e.g., to the
rejection reversal-is indicated along the x-axis and the examiner grant rate
is indicated along the y-axis.
We acknowledge that an event-study exercise of this nature confronts
various obstacles. The first such obstacle is that examiners may experience
multiple events of interest over their careers-e.g., multiple rejection
reversals by PTAB. To the extent there is possibly more than one such event
per examiner, it is difficult to trace the average behavior across all examiners
in the time leading up to and following rejection reversals or PTAB post-grant
challenges in the graphical manner discussed above. If everyone were to
experience a second (or third, etc.) event and if everyone experienced that
subsequent event at the same length of time following the first event, then we
could indeed graphically depict day-by-day how examiner behavior evolves on
average as we approach the first event, the second event, etc. However, the
reality is that not all examiners will experience a second event and those that
do experience subsequent events do so at different lengths of time following
the first, making it difficult in a single graph to trace average examiner
behavior before and after the first event, before and after the second, etc.
Given these challenges, we instead elect to trace examiner behavior before
and after the first relevant event that they experience over their career-e.g.,
the first time they have a rejection reversed by PTAB.
The essence of this event study approach is to look for changes in
behavior over "event time" in order to infer changes in behavior that result
from the events themselves. This structure, however, poses a second key
empirical challenge-i.e., the need to separate the effects of the event
occurring from other factors that also change over time and may affect
examiner grant rates. For instance, changes in the law respecting patentable
subject matter over time may lead to changes over "calendar time" in
examiner grant rates. Relatedly, as we think about the determinants of
examiner behavior, another factor that naturally changes over time is their
level of experience, which may also alter examiner behavior considering the
possibility that examiners will learn over time how to more efficiently conduct
examination reviews.5 0 Examiners also receive promotions over time, which
our prior research has shown strongly impacts examiner grant rates due to
the changes in examination time allocations.5'
To address these concerns, we use multi-variate regression techniques to
estimate the relationship between examiner grant rates and the relevant event
time-e.g., the proximity of the time in which the application is disposed of
relative to the time of the examiner's first rejection reversal by PTAB-while
controlling for the above-mentioned factors. In more specific terms, using our
application-level data, we regress the incidence of the application in question

50.

Frakes & Wasserman, supranote 14, at 550.

51.

Id. at 554-55-
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being allowed by the examiner on a set of indicator variables capturing
different windows of time around the relevant PTAB event-e.g., indicator
variables for whether the application in question was disposed of by the
relevant examiner in the period of time between o and 2oo days following the
examiner's first PTAB rejection reversal, between 2oo and 400 days following
the examiner's first PTAB rejection reversal, etc. Indications for periods of
time leading up to the event are also included. To control for the other factors
that may likewise change over time and potentially confound this analysis, we
include the following controls: (1) application-disposition-year-by-month
fixed effects (i.e., indicator variables for each separate calendar month-year
combination over the sample, assigned based on the timing of the disposition
of the application), (2) examiner-experience fixed effects (in years), and
(3) examiner GS pay-level fixed effects.>=
Since examiners start at the Patent Office in different years, get
promoted at different stages of experience, and experience their first PTAB
evaluation event at different periods of time, it becomes statistically possible
to separate out the effects of event time from these other factors. Helpful in
this regard is the fact that we would be drawing on nearly four million patent
applications over a roughly i6-year period to achieve this statistical
separation. In the figures that follow, we will present the results from these
regressions graphically. To do so, we plot the estimated coefficients of the
indicator variables for the different event-time bins. In the process, we deliver
on the graphs promised above-e.g., plotting the time leading up to and
following PTAB evaluation event of interest on the x-axis and the examiner
grant rate on the y-axis-while adjusting the depicted grant-rate trend for
other related factors that likewise change over time, allowing us to better
interpret any changes in this trend around the time of the event as arising
from the event itself. We further note that the regressions producing these
graphs drop the indicator variable representing the 2oo days leading up to
PTAB event such that this time period will serve as the reference period in the
presented graphs.
In the first event-study graph that we present, Figure 3, we focus on
exploring how examiner behavior changes after examiners experience their
first board reversal at PTAB (or BPAI). The timing of the event itself in Figure
3 is based on the date of PTAB's reversal decision. As depicted, we find that
We also control for whether or not the applicant has "small entity" status with the Patent
52.
Office. Each regression also includes a set of examiner fixed effects, allowing us to account
flexibly for fixed differences in inherent granting tendencies across each examiner in the sample.
In this light, the graphs presented below can be seen as tracing out an individual examiner's
granting trends as that examiner approaches and moves beyond their first PTAB evaluation event.
Examiners that never experienced the relevant PTAB event--e.g., that never had a rejection
reversed by PTAB-are also included in the underlying regression. Their presence in the
regression is nonetheless useful to help identify the other key parameters of the regression
model--e.g., the overall time trends. We also note that the presented results are virtually identical

if we also include technology group fixed effects.
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grant rates indeed jump upwards following this first reversal event by close to
two percentage points-or by upwards of three percent relative to the mean
grant rate. Coupled with the above findings that PTAB targets its rejection
reversal efforts at below-grant-rate examiners, these findings of increased
grant rates following an examiner's first PTAB rejection reversal imply that
PTAB may indeed help induce convergence in examiner grant rates from the
bottom of the distribution.
Figure 3, however, does present one important concern. It appears grant
rates may have been trending upward prior to the timing of the first rejection
reversal. This fact raises a concern that the increased grant rates were caused
by some factor omitted from the model, as opposed to the reversal event. On
the other hand, this pre-trend may still be consistent with a causal effect of
PTAB reversals and may simply reflect PTAB (or BPAI) proceedings that
occurred in the time leading up to the final decision. The time between filing
rejection appeals and handing down final decisions is considerable. During
the interim, while the Board is examining the decision and calling upon the
examiner to provide certain answers regarding the basis for their decision,
the examiner may receive various signals from the Board that likewise cause
them to adjust their behavior-e.g., to be more permissive in the case of overly
restrictive examiners.
Figure 3. Event-Study Analysis: Relationship between Examiner Grant
Rates and Time Leading up to and Subsequent to Date of Examiner's First
Rejection Reversal at PTAB (or BPAI)
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In Figure 4, we explore whether examiners are indeed altering their
behavior based on occurrences that transpire earlier in the appeal process.
For these purposes, we now treat as the relevant "event" the first time that an
examiner experiences an appeal to the Board of a rejection decision, where
the timing of the event is based on the timing of the notice of appeal. In this
alternative approach, we ask how an examiner's behavior changes around the
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time of their first ever experience with PTAB (or BPAI) rejection-evaluation
process. As demonstrated by Figure 4, we no longer find that grant rates were
trending upwards prior to the examiner's first rejection-appeal event, but
instead that the increase in their granting tendencies appears to occur at the
moment of the rejection-challenge event itself. Subsequent to that event, the
examiner's grant rate appears to rise monotonically over time.
The above figures are similar in that they model behavior before and
after a single event. As discussed above, some examiners experience multiple
encounters with PTAB over their careers. While that fact complicated the
ability to structure an event-time figure in terms of days leading up to and
following multiple events of this nature, it is nonetheless possible to structure
an event-time figure of an alternative nature. In this alternative graphical
approach, we simply plot an examiner's grant rate on the y-axis against the
sequence of rejection reversals on the x-axis. The event-time of significance
in this approach is thus the number of rejection reversals as opposed to days
before and after a reversal. We present the results of this exercise in Figure 5,
where the time before the first rejection reversal is the reference period. We
follow examiners through four reversals. To ensure balance in the process, we
focus on examiners that experience at least four rejection reversals over their
career. Admittedly, this is a select group, as only 19% of examiners have at
least this many reversals over their career. We generated the results depicted
in Figure 5 from a regression that allows us to estimate the relationship
between grant rates and rejection-reversal sequencing while controlling for
the same set of time-varying controls included in the above regressions. As
demonstrated, we find that grant rates jump by over two percentage points
after the first reversal, consistent with the above findings. Thereafter, grant
rates continue to rise monotonically with subsequent reversal events.
All told, the results paint a strong and consistent picture that grant rates
rise subsequent to experiences with a PTAB reversal of a rejection decision.
This finding reinforces the conclusion that PTAB may alter examiner
behavior in a way that causes examiners to exhibit less heterogeneous
behavior.
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Figure 4. Event-Study Analysis: Relationship between Examiner Grant
Rates and Time Leading up to and Subsequent to Date of Examiner's first
Filing of Notice of Appeal of a Rejection Decision to PTAB (or BPAI)
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Figure 5. Relationship between Examiner Grant Rates and Sequence of
Rejection Reversal Among Examiners that Experience at Least 4 Reversals
over their Career
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In our final empirical exercise, we now turn to evaluating how examiners
respond to their first encounter with PTAB post-grant challenge. For these
purposes, we employ an event-study methodology similar to that explored in
Figures 3 and 4. As discussed above, we are limited in our ability to perform
as rich of an analysis in this setting for a number of reasons, including the fact
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that PTAB only began to allow such challenges in late 2012 and by the fact
that the data we have collected only have the date of PTAB challenge filing
itself.53 With these caveats in mind, we present the results of this exercise in
Figure 6, exploring how grant rates evolve in the periods leading up and
subsequent to the filing date of an examiner's first challenge against a patent
that he or she issued. As demonstrated by this figure and as predicted by
Hypothesis 2, grant rates do fall subsequent to this first PTAB post-grant event.
However, the magnitude is far smaller than PTAB rejection-reversal results.
By two years following the event, grant rates have only fallen by about 0.5
percentage points and even at that date we cannot reject that there was no
change at all given the width of the estimated confidence intervals. By the
time we have reached 12oo days (just over three years) following the first postgrant challenge, grant rates have fallen by roughly 1.5 percentage points (now
statistically distinguishable from zero). Accordingly, there is some evidence to
suggest that examiner grant rates do fall after PTAB has been called upon to
evaluate a patent grant that it had issued in the past. However, this post-grantevaluation reaction appears much less sensitive than PTAB rejectionevaluation response.
Figure 6. Event-Study Analysis: Relationship between Examiner Grant
Rates and Time Leading up to and Subsequent to Date of Examiner's first
Post-Grant Challenge at PTAB
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NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that PTAB is bringing more consistency to patent
examiner decision-making. More specifically, our results suggest that patent
grants by lenient examiners are more likely to be appealed and reversed by
PTAB than patent grants by non-lenient examiners. Our results also
demonstrate that patent denials by restrictive examiners are more likely to be
appealed and reversed by PTAB than patent denials by non-restrictive
examiners. Finally, our findings also suggest that rejection reversals by PTAB
results in granting tendencies to rise and patent invalidations by PTAB results
in granting tendencies to fall. Collectively, these results imply that PTAB
causes restrictive and lenient examiners to move toward the average grant rate
of patent examiners. In other words, PTAB has a unifying effect on patent
examiner's decision-making.
This is all good news, but even with PTAB's consistency-enhancing effect,
there has been increasing concern that patentability decisions at the Patent
Office are inconsistent. This Part thus considers the ways in which PTAB could
further enhance the ability of the adjudicatory board to bring uniformity to
examiner decision making.
While our findings suggest that PTAB is bringing uniformity to patent
examiner decisions, our results also suggest that the adjudicatory board is
better able to induce convergence in the behavior of overly restrictive
examiners rather than overly permissive ones. We attribute this trend to
several factors. First, the adjudicatory board does not have as many
opportunities to correct overly permissive examiners as it does overly
restrictive examiners, as patent denials are more frequently challenged in a
PTAB proceeding than patent grants. In fiscal year 2017, PTAB decided over
14,ooo appeals from patent denials and approximately 1,500 challenges of

patent grants.54 The lopsided nature of challenges before PTAB stems from
several factors, including the fact that unlike patent denials, the validity of
issued patents can also be directly challenged in federal district court.
Although PTAB has proved to be a more popular forum for challenging
granted patents than initial projections suggest,55 the majority of issued
patents are still challenged only in federal court.56 Moreover, because postgrant PTAB proceedings are more formal and trial-like than patent-denial

54. USPTO PAR 2017, supra note 1, at 181-82. The difference in numbers stems from a
number of factors including PTAB's procedures associated with reviewing a patent grant are
more formal and court like, resulting in substantially higher legal fees, than the procedures
associated with the Board's review of patent denials. See Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric
Incentives, supra note 32, at 401-06.
55.
56.

See USPTO PAR 2013, supranote 40, at 23.
Vishnubhakat et al., supranote 42, at 69.
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PTAB proceedings, the former are much more expensive than the latter.57
The difference in costs also likely contributes to the skewed review rates.
It is difficult to utilize PTAB to more effectively target appeals of
permissive patent examiners because the adjudicatory board relies on third
parties to challenge the validity of a patent at the Board. As a result, the Patent
Office should consider other methods to review the patentability decisions of
permissive patent examiners. Currently, the Patent Office conducts a random
sampling method of patent examiner decisions that are subject to further
quality review.58 We recommend that the Patent Office sample more heavily
from patent examiners whose grant rates are in the top quartile of the Agency
in an effort to provide further consistency to examiner determinations.
The second reason why PTAB's ability to bring uniformity to examiner
decision-making is skewed stems from our results suggesting the specific
deterrence effect of reversal is stronger for patent denials than patent grants.
More specifically, our findings suggest that examiners who have a patent
denial reversed show a greater response in their grant rates than examiners
who have a patent grant reversed.so There are a number of reasons a patent
examiner may be more responsive to the reversal of a patent denial than a
patent grant. Perhaps most saliently, patent examiners are directly involved in
PTAB proceedings involving patent denials. Examiners whose patent
rejection is appealed to the adjudicatory board meet with several senior
examiners to review the rejection decision and write and file a brief outlining
6
their reasons why they rejected the application with PTAB. o If the
adjudicatory board reverses its decision, the application is returned to the
examiner to issue the patent grant. In contrast, patent examiners are not part
of the post-grant PTAB proceedings. That is, they do not file any materials
with the adjudicatory board defending their decision. In fact, PTAB
determination is never forwarded directly to the examiner in question.

See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2017, at 30,
(noting the median cost of post-grant proceedings before the Patent Office to each
side is $200,000 through the end of motion practice, $250,ooo through PTAB hearing, and
$350,000 through appeal whereas the median cost of patent denial proceeding before the Patent

57.

51 (2017)

Office is less than $10,000).

58. The Patent Office sampling percentage has varied over the years. For instance, in 1996
the Agency cut the personnel of the Office of Patent Quality Review in half which resulted in the
Agency sampling only two percent of allowed applications, which was well below the four percent
sampling rate the Agency had determined was necessary to provide valid results. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AUDIT REPORT No. PTD-99 77-7-oool, PATENT
QuALITY CONTROLS ARE INADEQUATE (1997).
59. See supraPart IHl.
6o. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 1207.01 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s12o7.html (noting that
"[t]he participants of the appeal conference should include (1) the examiner charged with
preparation of the examiner's answer, (2) a supervisory patent examiner (SPE), and (3) another
examiner, known as a conferee, having sufficient experience to be of assistance in the
consideration of the merits of the issues on appeal").
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To increase the ability of PTAB to bring uniformity to overly permissive
patent examiners, we encourage the Patent Office to increase the flow of
information from post-grant proceedings to patent examiners. The Agency
has made moves to bridge the gap between post-grant PTAB proceedings and
patent examiners with a 201 1 pilot program designed to enhance
communication between patent examiners and PTAB.6i The pilot program,
which included feedback on best practices, focused on providing patent
examiners, who were reviewing patent applications related to an ongoing
PTAB trial proceeding, information on prior art and arguments.2 We
applaud the Agency for taking this critical first step and encourage the Patent
Office to continue to increase the flow of information between PTAB and
patent examiners. By providing patent examiners with direct feedback on
cases involving patents they issued as well as providing best practices or
common mistakes to all patent examiners, the Patent Office can harness the
adjudicatory board's ability to bring more uniformity and improve patent
examiner decision-making.

61.
Post Grant Outcomes Pilot, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
patent/initiatives/post-grant-outcomes-pilot (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).

62.

Id.

